Le demandeur et le défendeur, toutes deux sociétés, ont conclu un contrat selon lequel le demandeur devait fournir des services à la filiale du défendeur située en Extrême-Orient, dans le but d'obtenir des contrats et d'assurer la planification stratégique. Le contrat était étroitement lié à la personne de Monsieur X qui, le jour même de la signature du contrat, a été nommé directeur général de ladite filiale. Le demandeur a engagé une procédure d'arbitrage afin de récupérer l'argent qu'il prétend lui être dû au titre du contrat. Le défendeur a soulevé des exceptions relatives à la compétence et à la procédure affirmant que le demandeur était une société fictive dépourvue de ce fait de la capacité d'intenter une procédure et que c'était Monsieur X et non pas le demandeur qui était véritablement partie au contrat. Ces affirmations ont été niées par le demandeur qui a déclaré que les parties avaient volontairement décidé de structurer leur relation à l'aide de deux contrats distincts : d'une part le contrat entre le demandeur et le défendeur et d'autre part, la lettre de nomination entre la filiale extrême-orientale du défendeur et Monsieur X, l'un et l'autre étant régis par un droit différent et contenant des clauses attributives de juridiction différentes : le droit suisse et l'arbitrage de la CCI dans le premier cas et le droit et les tribunaux du pays d'Extrême-Orient dans le second cas. Le défendeur a contesté cette affirmation en faisant observer que le contrat contenait les principales conditions concernant l'emploi de Monsieur X. Il a fait valoir en outre que Monsieur X devrait être considéré comme étant la partie véritable en application de la doctrine de la levée du voile social. Après avoir constaté que le demandeur n'était pas une société fictive et qu'il était juridiquement capable d'être partie à l'arbitrage et qu'il n'y avait aucune preuve d'absence d'accord, d'erreur importante ou de dol lors de la conclusion de la convention d'arbitrage, l'arbitre unique s'est prononcé ainsi sur la question de la doctrine de la levée du voile social.

'Defendant argues that even if [Claimant] were not a simulated party, Mr [X] would nevertheless be a party to the . . . Agreement due to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil . . . The Parties agreed that both the . . . Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are subject to Swiss substantive law (Art. 4 of the Terms of Reference). Claimant states that the doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil is an institute of substantive law and is, therefore, subject to Swiss law pursuant to Art. 187 SPILA . . . Similarly, Defendant makes arguments in the context with the piercing of the corporate veil under Art. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code ("CC") . . . Both learned legal writers and an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in Switzerland are of the opinion that the extension of arbitration clauses to third parties is-for Arbitral Tribunals sitting in Switzerland-an issue to be resolved under Art. 178 (2) SPILA (Berger, International Economic Arbitration, Deventer and Boston 1993, p. 173, footnote 921; ASA Bulletin 1992, pp. 209-210). Since Defendant wants to extend the reach of the Arbitration Agreement based on the theory of piercing the corporate veil, the issue is one of the substantive validity of the Arbitration Agreement. Thus, the Sole Arbitrator considers it appropriate to apply Swiss substantive law to this issue.

The doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil can apply in a case when a company is used by an individual as a trustee (Claimant) for certain purposes. If either the trustor (Mr [X]) or the trustee then have signed an agreement, including an arbitration clause, the effect of this agreement may be extended to the respective partner in the trust relationship (O. Sandrock, Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to non-Signatories, ASA Bulletin Special Series, no. 8, December 1994, p. 172). The basic notion of the doctrine of the piercing the corporate veil is that the legal veil which separates the company from its beneficial owner can be disregarded if reliance on the separateness of the entity from the individual would constitute an abuse of law. Under Swiss law, this doctrine is generally considered to be a case of Art. 2 CC.

The typical case for the application of the doctrine of the piercing veil is the one person stock corporation which is economically more or less identical with its shareholders. However, the fact that an individual owns a corporation is as such no reason to apply the doctrine. Swiss law allows the piercing of the corporate veil under exceptional circumstances in cases of clear and flagrant abuses of law (see, e.g., Forstmoser/Meyer-Hayoz/Nobel, Schweizerisches Aktienrecht, Berne 1966, para. 62, Ann. 56; BG 113 II 36, consideration 2c, with further references).

Defendant states that it would be against good faith for Claimant to rely on the Arbitration Agreement of the . . . Agreement because the . . . Agreement was concluded entirely for Mr [X]'s benefit . . . Claimant argues that [Claimant] was not merely introduced for the tax benefit of Mr [X] . . . Defendant's witnesses Messrs. [A] and [B], on the other hand, stated that . . . Agreement was made exclusively for the tax benefit of Mr [X]. However, Mr [A] also conceded that the tax issue was an issue considered during the negotiations of the Old . . . Agreement when he stated the payment of the taxes under the [Letter of Appointment] by Defendant was part of the deal and when he said that Mr [X] was responsible for the tax payments under the . . . Agreement. Mr [C, witness] was even more explicit when stating that the onshore/offshore structure had also advantages for the employer and not only for the employee. Mr [C] also stated that the onshore/offshore structure did not cause any tax problems in [Far East country] and, thereby, implied that the structure was fully within the law.

Considering the interests of the Parties, the negotiation of the . . . Agreement and the other circumstances of the case, the Sole Arbitrator is convinced that it is not abusive of Claimant to rely on the Arbitration Agreement and that Defendant has not shown that the piercing of the corporate veil with regard to the Arbitration Agreement were justified. It should be noted in this context that the separability doctrine applies and that Defendant has not shown that the doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil would apply here with the effect that only Mr [X] (but not Claimant) could sue Defendant in arbitration or that they could only sue Defendant together.'